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ABSTRACT  
While cybercrime proliferates – becoming more complex and surreptitious on the Internet – the tools and 
techniques used in performing digital investigations are still largely lagging behind, effectively slowing 
down law enforcement agencies at large. Real-time remote acquisition of digital evidence over the 
Internet is still an elusive ideal in the combat against cybercrime. In this paper we briefly describe the 
architecture of a comprehensive proactive digital investigation system that is termed as the Live Evidence 
Information Aggregator (LEIA). This system aims at collecting digital evidence from potentially any 
device in real time over the Internet. Particular focus is made on the importance of the efficiency of the 
network communication in the evidence acquisition phase, in order to retrieve potentially evidentiary 
information remotely and with immediacy. Through a proof of concept implementation, we demonstrate 
the live, remote evidence capturing capabilities of such a system on small scale devices, highlighting the 
necessity for better throughput envisioned through the use of Peer-to-Peer overlays.  
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Digital Evidence, Remote acquisition, Proactive forensics, Mobile devices, 
P2P, Network performance 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Malevolent activities, quickly adapt and evolve to 
align themselves with the particularities of their 
given environment. This is seen in that they are no 
longer only a confined to the physical world. They 
have readily adapted to the digital realm, taking up 
their niche markedly on the Internet. Examples of 
such are the Zeus banking Trojan (Stone-Gross, 
2012) and the Flame malware (sKyWIper Analysis 
Team, 2012) stealing banking credentials and 
performing espionage activities respectively. They 
are no longer rare occurrences with mild 
consequences. They have permanently set up 
camp in intricate and surreptitious forms, taking 
unjust advantage over unsuspecting users going 
about commonplace activities on the Internet. The 
Regin malware (Kaspersky Lab, 2014), formally 
analyzed and documented in 2014 as a 
cyberespionage tool, is an example of this, having 
said to have been possibly in the wild since 2003. 
Today, all activities in digital realm are at the risk 
of being compromised by malicious actors aiming 
at perpetrating theft, impersonation, sabotage or to 
paralyze others’ activities for personal benefit.  
The consequences of such malicious activities for 
the unsuspecting user have also become more 
detrimental, persistent and having far reaching 
effects in that they are largely untraceable and 
easily invisible to the untrained eye. Developing 
novel and innovative methods that enable 
malicious activities to remain effectively 
undetected and untraceable, is the hallmark of 
these evildoers. They are almost always one step 
ahead of the pursuers. Furthermore, it is relatively 
easy to hide among the deluge of data that is 
created among communication devices that 
support the basic network communication on the 
internet. Malevolent activity in the “Digital 
Realm” can thus, easily become rampant and 
uncontrollable if there are no equally innovative 
methods to counter the offending actors and their 
activities. The rate of innovation and uptake of 
novel techniques by law enforcement agencies, 
digital forensics practitioners and incident 
responders must at the very least be equivalent to 
that of their criminal counterparts, if they are to 
keep up with the proliferation of crime on the 
Internet. 
One of the foremost areas in digital crime 
investigations where innovative means of 
combatting crime are highly necessary, but largely 
lacking, is the evidence capture process. This is 
the initial stage of an investigation where artifacts 
from the scene of the crime need to be retrieved in 
their original form, or, in the case of digital 
investigations, in some form of a complete copy of 
the original artifact that can be proven to be 
devoid of any tampering (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2004) (Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE), 
2006). This process needs to be performed 
meticulously, carefully and in many cases slowly 
in order to ensure that there is no potentially 
crucial piece of evidence left behind. This is the 
state of affairs in the real physical world. 
However, today’s crime scene is rapidly edging 
away from a physical reality into a more virtual 
one. The forms of evidence found in these “Digital 
Crime Scenes” have also moved from the 
traditional fingerprints, footprints, hair samples, 
blood samples or other DNA related evidence, into 
more digital artifacts.. Such digital forms of 
evidence commonly include hard-disk drives, live 
(RAM) memory, network traffic captures, mobile 
devices, RAID sets (M. Cohen, Garfinkel, & 
Schatz, 2009), and virtually any other form of 
technology that records past events of its actions; 
that can be captured and can be analyzed during or 
after the criminal event and whose integrity can be 
verified.  
This opens the floor to almost any form of 
computer appliance (physical or virtual) that can 
be thought of. Thus arises the heterogeneity 
problem among devices – or simply put the 
seeming lack of standardization among vendors of 
devices that perform related tasks. Different 
devices may have different physical connectors, 
operating systems, software applications, storage 
formats, encoding schemes and communication 
protocols (CDESF Working Group, 2006). This 
heterogeneity makes the job of a Digital 
Investigator a lot more difficult because of the 
wide variety in which evidence could manifest 
itself in the wild. This greatly hampers any manual 
efforts of collecting evidence, even with the 
assistance of semi-automated tools of today such 
as disk imagers.  
In addition to this, Electronic Crime cases today 
often involve more than just a single device. 
Several computer-like appliances including 
tablets, mobile phones, digital cameras, GPS 
devices, smart-TV’s and even embedded devices 
such as onboard vehicle computer systems (from 
trucks, cars and even ships) could be seized for a 
single case, in order to be subjected to further 
investigative analysis. If we also bring in the vast 
realm of the Internet also into play, such evidence 
sources could include web application accounts, 
online email accounts, cloud storage facilities, 
network traffic captures and logs (Raghavan, 
Clark, & Mohay, 2009). It is not difficult to 
imagine that all these evidence forms could easily 
be part of a single case in today’s world and even 
more so in the imminent realm of the Internet of 
Things. The sheer volume of data that one would 
have to sift through in order to investigate a single 
case could be in the order of Terabytes and can be 
a more than daunting task to perform. (Case, 
Cristina, Marziale, Richard, & Roussev, 2008) 
Furthermore, in the realm of the Internet, 
composed of massively interconnected devices 
sharing vast amounts of highly varying data, 
crossing paths at high velocities, the speed of the 
capture of potentially evidentiary information is of 
essence. The same levels of meticulousness and 
carefulness of physical evidence acquisition may 
as well be sacrificed to some extent for the agility 
that is needed in reacting to crime in the digital 
world. This is because potentially evidentiary 
information that is not captured almost 
instantaneously, is likely to be lost forever in just a 
matter of seconds. However, this does not mean 
that all accuracy and care in collection of digital 
evidence artifacts is ignored, rather it is traded-off 
and reduced in favour of speed. Nevertheless, the 
maintenance of the chain of custody is always very 
important in any digital investigation. New 
methods of achieving similar standards of the 
preservation of digital evidence to those of 
physical evidence also need to be sought after and 
integrated into legal standards.  
Finally, at present, investigators grapple with the 
problem of the relatively immature forensic tools 
that they are presented with. Current industry 
standard forensic tools such as EnCase, FTK, 
XRY, Volatility and Wireshark, at the moment of 
writing, do not cater for the highly divergent 
nature of digital evidence sources. Most, if not all 
tools, focus on a single niche area such as 
Filesystem Data, Live Memory, Network Traffic, 
Mobile Devices or Log data. None of these tools 
provide a comprehensive method to interface with 
all the variety present to provide a uniform 
investigation platform. In addition to this, current 
tools have rather limited capabilities for capturing 
potentially evidentiary data on demand over 
networks as well as dealing with extremely large 
datasets. Most of the tools would struggle and 
would quickly become problematic when 
presented with Internet-Scale crime scenes. 
In this paper, we present the architecture of a 
scalable, distributed, multi-component incident 
response and digital investigation platform aimed 
at dealing with large scale distributed cybercrime 
investigations. We name this system the Live 
Evidence Information Aggregator, or LEIA, in 
short. The LEIA architecture aims at curbing 
cybercrime through assisting digital forensics 
practitioners and law enforcement agencies in 
improving their digital crime response capabilities.  
This is to be done through addressing several of 
the aforementioned problems such as the innate 
and growing complexity of the fast growing 
“Internet-of-Things” types of cases as well as 
dealing with the constantly growing amounts of 
heterogeneous data vis-a-vis the present shortage 
of physical resources and technical capacity within 
Law Enforcement. We also address the need for 
proactive collection of evidence from potential 
evidence sources on-demand over public 
networks, and further show the need for faster 
throughput network transfers such as those seen in 
Peer to Peer technologies. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows: In Section 2, we review 
related work outlining shortcomings of previous 
similar solutions. Section 3 describes the 
requirements for a comprehensive distributed 
digital investigation platform. The functionality of 
the LEIA system with particular focus on the 
networking component is described in Section 4. 
The network-focused proof of concept 
implementation and results are outlined in Section 
5. In Section 6 and 7, we summarize the work 
done in this study and propose further work that 
may be done in this area, respectively. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Several progressive efforts have been made 
towards improving the efficiency of the Digital 
Investigation process. The motivations behind 
these have spawned from the changing 
requirements of national and international legal 
systems, the evolution in the digital crime scene, 
the visible backlogs of cases overburdening law 
enforcement agencies and advances in 
technological capabilities.  
Some of these efforts include: Delegation and 
collaboration among teams; Reduction of evidence 
sizes through filtering out known files; and simple 
automation of important but mundane, repetitive 
tasks (such as indexing data for subsequent 
searches, file carving, parsing running process in 
memory or TCP flows in network captures). Most 
of these capabilities have been implemented in 
current industry standard forensic tools, however, 
investigators and analysts still remain 
overburdened (van Baar, van Beek, & van Eijk, 
2014). This is because of the presently abundant 
and steadily growing amounts of heterogeneous 
and disjointed datasets from multiple sources that 
they are tasked to collect and analyze. Methods to 
alleviate this problem through fully automating the 
remote collection and pre-processing of such data 
are so far either lacking in efficiency or in 
scalability.  
Several unidirectional solutions, such as, 
(Almulhem & Traore, 2005) have been proposed 
in a bid to solve this multi-faceted problem, 
however, they have not been unequivocally 
successful. In recent times there have been 
initiatives to centralize evidence storage (Ren & 
Jin, 2005), but distribute processing among several 
machines (Roussev & Richard III, 2004). There 
has also been a push towards having the different 
parties, involved in solving a case to work 
together, even from geographically separate 
locations (Davis, Manes, & Shenoi, 2005), 
particularly with respect to technical staff in niche 
areas  (such as filesystem forensics, network 
forensics, live memory forensics or mobile 
forensics) and the legal experts. Collaboration has 
been the mainstay of the attempt to get cases 
solved faster. 
Reducing the amount of data that is needed to be 
collected is also a means of reducing the amount 
of time needed to analyze the data. This has 
previously been done through “Known File 
Filtering” as well as through scripts crafted to use 
heuristics (Koopmans & James, 2013). Network 
Security Monitoring has also been an avenue for 
gathering data with the help of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS’s) assisted through data mining (Leu 
& Yang, 2003). However, this has been the 
specific mandate of the IDS, centralized or 
distributed, as the case may be, with terminating 
(end) devices or intermediary devices generally 
playing very minor roles in this task. 
As far as is known to the author, there has not 
been much done, through any single initiative, in 
terms of expanding the scope of data captured to 
be the mandate of all possible devices of 
reasonable capability. Enabling individual devices 
to natively act as part of the Incidence Response 
System, towards the aim of collecting potential 
evidentiary data, has not been widely studied. 
Additionally, collaboration on the human 
processing level has been emphasized, but it has 
not been introduced among unrelated networked 
devices. These devices could possibly be 
harnessed to work together towards aiding in 
intelligent real-time capturing, filtering and 
processing in order to attain and retain that which 
could be considered as possible evidentiary data, 
antecedent to the event of a crime being detected. 
It is for these reasons that we delve into this area 
to explore it further. 
Notable related studies include (Zonouz, Joshi, & 
Sanders, 2011), that describes a live network 
forensics system that provisions varying Intrusion 
Detection Systems on host machines based on 
their respective resource costs. It works in a 
virtualized environment where snapshots are taken 
periodically and used to revert the system back to 
the point before an attack began. Each system 
rollback results in a different IDS’s being 
deployed to collect new and possibly better 
information. This presupposes that the attacker re-
enacts their malicious behavior in a similar way to 
their previous attempts, each time their efforts are 
thwarted by the system. Storage of the potential 
evidentiary information in a forensically sound 
manner is not particularly dealt with in this study. 
The aim was to understand attacks better in order 
to make better decisions on what kind of 
preventive measures to deploy. 
(Shields, Frieder, & Maloof, 2011), (Yu et al., 
2005), (M. I. Cohen, Bilby, & Caronni, 2011), and 
(Moser & Cohen, 2013) describe distributed 
system architectures for proactive collection and 
summarization of evidence, with centralized data 
storage and processing. They are, however, 
particularly directed at closed domain enterprise 
systems, where there is some form of control and 
order instigated by system administrators. 
Participation of computer systems outside the 
control of the enterprise is not considered. The 
system being proposed in this study is aimed at 
being universal – applying to the entire Internet.  
The work done by Redding in (Redding, 2005) is 
the most closely related study done in the area of 
pro-active and collaborative computer forensic 
analysis among heterogeneous systems. Redding 
proposes a peer-to-peer framework for network 
monitoring and forensics through which network 
security events can be collected and shared among 
the peers. “Analysis, forensic preservation and 
reporting of related information can be performed 
using spare CPU cycles,” (Redding, 2005) 
together with other spare, under-utilized, or 
unused resources. This system however seems to 
be designed to collect only network security 
events and not any other forms of evidence from 
individual host devices Furthermore it seems to be 
aimed towards an “administratively closed 
environment” under the control of some systems 
administrator within an enterprise. An open 
system that has the Internet as its domain of 
operation assisting in the collection of any form of 
computer based evidence is what is not dealt with 
in Redding’s work. Thus, it is this that is sought 
after in the current study as will be described later 
in this paper. 
In order to facilitate uniform, seamless exchange 
of forensic artifacts between heterogeneous 
entities, some form of standardization of the 
transmitted evidence formats is necessary. One of 
the bodies that has made proposals related to this 
is the Common Digital Evidence Storage Format 
Working Group (CDESF Working Group, 2006). 
Other notable efforts include (Schatz & Clark, 
2006) which makes use of the Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) from Semantic 
Web technologies as a common data 
representation layer for digital evidence related 
metadata, using ontologies for describing the 
vocabulary related to this data, and (Kahvedžić & 
Kechadi, 2009) where a detailed ontology of 
Windows Registry artifacts of interests is 
introduced. The Open Forensic Integration 
Architecture (FIA) in (Raghavan et al., 2009) and 
FACE (Case et al., 2008) describe methods for the 
integration of digital evidence from multiple 
evidence sources in a bid to facilitate more 
efficient analysis. The Advanced Forensic Format 
(Garfinkel, 2006), AFF4 (M. Cohen et al., 2009) 
and XIRAF (Alink, Bhoedjang, Boncz, & de 
Vries, 2006) describe annotated evidence storage 
formats that allow for addition of arbitrary 
metadata as well as interoperability among 
different tools.  
In AFF4  (M. Cohen et al., 2009), notably, remote 
evidence capture, some form of  availability 
through manually driven redundancy, and some 
parallelism in the evidence capture process of 
RAID data sets is also present. However it seems 
that the initiation of these processes is instigated 
through human intervention. They are not fully 
automated through machine triggers, and thus 
could be slow to react in acquiring evidence. The 
availability (fail-over) provided through 
redundancy is based on whether the evidence 
captured is required in other locations. If it is not 
required elsewhere, then the fail-over mechanism 
would not work because there would be only one 
copy of the evidence. The parallelism (described 
particularly for acquiring individual disks in a 
RAID set) is unclear whether it could also apply in 
parallelizing other potential evidence data sources 
such as RAM memory or NAND storage on 
mobile devices. 
The proposed idea that this study covers is 
composed of several areas of specialization, 
namely: The Internet of Things (IoT), Intrusion 
Detection Systems, Peer to Peer Networks, 
Virtualization infrastructures, Large Scale Cloud 
storage and Semantic Web technologies. Most of 
these technologies have been previously harnessed 
in different capacities, singularly or in small 
clusters, towards the benefit of digital forensics for 
today’s complex internetworked and intertwined 
cyber realm. However, to the author’s knowledge, 
there has so far not been any work done that aims 
to merge all these technologies together in order to 
provide a singular scalable solution that solves the 
recurring problems of large amounts of data, 
several sources of evidence, inability of collecting 
evidence efficiently over networks, heterogeneity 
among systems, insufficient processing power, 
security and privacy – that are constantly troubling 
digital forensic analysts and law enforcement 
agencies worldwide. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DESIRED 
SOLUTION 
Inspired by the challenges documented by Palmer 
at the first DFRWS conference (Palmer, 2001), we 
describe below a wish-list of characteristics that 
one would like to have in a comprehensive Digital 
Forensics and Incident Response system for a 
public open domain networked environment such 
as the Internet. They are aimed at complementing 
and updating Palmer’s list in light of the current 
state of electronic crime and the present state of 
forensic tools, as described earlier. 
i. Distribution: The ability to deal with massive 
amounts of distribution in terms of participants, 
data storage, processing and dissemination. The 
system needs to be able to handle the 
heterogeneity that may come with distributed 
systems as well. 
ii. Scalability: Large scale interconnectivity, as 
well as the possibility of new entities joining, 
as well as others leaving the system 
dynamically and gracefully without drastic 
negative effects on the system. The ability to 
easily improve or extend the capabilities of the 
system through new modules is also desired. 
iii. Availability: Providing suitable levels of 
functionality as and when required. 
iv. Universality: Among the heterogeneity and 
lack of standardization among vendors of 
different systems, there needs to be some 
standardization and common understanding 
between the systems on the level of 
communication and storage of potential 
evidentiary information. 
v. Responsiveness: The system should be able to 
aptly detect when a security policy has been 
irrecoverably violated, thus collecting 
information in order to pursue the perpetrators 
of the criminal actions. This also improves on 
efficiency and privacy in that the system does 
not have to perpetually be collecting all 
possible information from all possible systems. 
vi. Resource Sharing: Today, large complex 
problems that are being solved through 
collaboration and sharing of resources as seen 
in Crowdsourcing, P2P networks, and cloud 
infrastructures. They provide on demand rapid 
availability of large amounts of resources from 
collective resource pools providing speed, 
efficiency and the benefits from “the wisdom 
of the crowd”. 
vii. Integrity (Trust, Reliability & Accuracy): As a 
system facilitating law enforcement in digital 
crimes, the levels of trust, reliability, accuracy 
and integrity of the information needs to be 
high enough to be accepted as a veritable 
source of evidentiary information for a court of 
law. The Daubert standards and the chain of 
custody need to be adhered to. 
viii. Privacy & Confidentiality: Personally 
identifiable and secret information must be 
maintained as anonymous and confidential as is 
reasonably acceptable, unless incriminated. 
Unauthorized access to such information is not 
to be allowed. 
ix. Security: In addition to ensuring the security of 
the potential evidentiary information that it 
aims to collect and process, it must also take its 
own security into consideration – especially in 
terms of authentication, authorization, 
accountability and non-repudiation of activities 
undertaken. 
 
4. LEIA: THE LIVE EVIDENCE 
INFORMATION AGGREGATOR  
The LEIA is a 4-tiered system architecture that 
may be described as a combination of hypervisors, 
intrusion detection systems, peer to peer systems 
and cloud storage. It is made up of the following 
components: 
a) The Host-based Hypervisor (HbH) 
b) The Peer-to-Peer Distribution Architecture 
(P2P-da) 
c) The Cloud-based Backend (CBB) 
d) The Law Enforcement Controller (LEC) 
The functionality of each of the layers of the LEIA 
system is briefly described in the following 
sections. 
 
4.1. The Host-based Hypervisor (HBH) 
The Host-based Hypervisor (HbH) system is 
composed of a virtualization layer managed by a 
hypervisor – a privileged secure platform 
managing the guest operating system (OS). The 
hypervisor contains an inbuilt host-based intrusion 
detection system also termed as the embedded 
intrusion detection system (em-IDS). Security 
utilities within the guest OS such as anti-malware 
tools and intrusion detection systems maintain 
their own data and logs that are accessible to the 
HbH. The HbH collects and assimilates the 
information that it gets from its own inbuilt 
intrusion detection system together with other 
information collected from the other security 
utilities that may exist within the guest OS. This 
helps in getting a better perspective of current 
malicious activity that may be underway. 
Further to this sharing of information within a 
single HbH system, individual HbH systems also 
share their information about malicious activity 
they may have discovered with each other. This 
communication is facilitated through the Peer-to-
Peer Distribution Architecture (P2P-da). This 
collaborative effort among the HbH systems 
further helps improve the accuracy of IDSs and 
eventually forensic data acquisition.  
In order to reduce the amount of data that may 
need to be collected for analysis, each HbH 
maintains a hash list of the local files on its guest 
operating system (Local - Known Data Hash-List, 
L-KDHL). This L-KDHL is periodically cross-
checked and updated against a Master – Known 
Data Hash-List (M-KDHL) stored at the Cloud-
based Backend (CBB). This is managed by the 
Cloud-based Backend Differencing Engine (CBB-
DE) component of the CBB. The aim of this is to 
quickly filter out known system data or files 
through matching the files on a HbH against 
hashes of system files that are known to be benign 
and have not been modified in an way.  
A user data profile with its corresponding hash-
lists is also created. The user-data hash-list is also 
maintained in a dual format – with a local copy 
residing on the HbH and a remote master copy 
being maintained at the CBB. Further to this the 
actual user data is backed up at the CBB. Thus, the 
user data hash lists are used to check which files 
have changed and may need to be backed up to the 
CBB. 
 
 
Figure 1: The components of the HbH component 
 
With respect to “Known Malicious Files” which 
are files that have been previously identified as 
having malicious content within them, a “Known 
Malicious File” hash list is to be maintained only 
on the CBB. It is not held on individual HbH 
systems as it can easily become large and 
unmanageable for a single HbH to maintain.  
The hypervisor is the critical element when it 
comes to the collection of potential evidentiary 
data. Having privileged access, the hypervisor is 
able to directly interact with the file system, 
network interfaces, memory caches and other low-
level resources, which are all primary sources of 
common evidentiary data in digital investigations. 
The embedded IDS’s (em-IDS) also collects 
information mostly in the form of logs which are 
parsed to result in synthesized alerts. When 
evidentiary data from the local HbH is collected, it 
is transmitted towards the CBB via neighbouring 
HbH systems through the action of the P2P-da 
system (described in the next section). While such 
data is in transit through a neighbouring HbH 
system, and travelling onward to the CBB, it is 
always held in an encrypted form and only within 
temporary storage. 
4.2. The Peer-to-Peer Distribution Architecture 
(P2P-da) 
The essence of the P2P-da is to provide reliability, 
scalability and rapid throughput of transmitted 
data even in the face of high rates of “churn”, that 
is, large numbers of nodes joining and leaving the 
network. In order to achieve this, a cocktail of P2P 
protocols are put together in order to extract the 
best qualities of these and also allow for each to 
compensate for the other’s shortcomings. The 
particular P2P protocols that are put together in 
order to build the P2P-da are: Gradient overlay 
protocols (Sacha, Dowling, Cunningham, & 
Meier, 2006) Epidemic protocols (Jelasity, 
Voulgaris, Guerraoui, Kermarrec, & Steen, 2007), 
and the Bit-Torrent protocol (B. Cohen, 2003). 
There are 3 main functionalities of the P2P-da: 
I. Maintenance of the P2P Overlay 
II. Dissemination and aggregation of Malicious 
Behaviour Information and alerts. 
III. Incident response data collection 
These functionalities generally correspond to the 
P2P protocols that make up the essence of the 
P2P-da. The function of the maintenance of the 
P2P overlay is facilitated mainly through gradient 
(hierarchical) overlays assisted through epidemic 
(gossip-based) overlays. The dissemination and 
aggregation of malicious behavior information is 
mainly facilitated by epidemic (gossip-based) 
overlays. Incident response data collection is 
mainly facilitated through an adaptation of the Bit-
Torrent protocol. The details behind these 
individual functionalities are dealt with in the 
following sections. 
4.2.1. Maintenance of the P2P Overlay 
The essence of this is for the overall P2P network 
to maintain connectivity among neighbouring 
nodes as well as the larger HbH node population. 
Further to this, the aim here is to link HbH nodes 
in such a way that they are most beneficial to each 
other as well as to the overall communication of 
security events and evidence transmission aims.  
In order to do this, a hierarchy is to be created 
among the peer nodes such that those less 
endowed with resources are lower in the hierarchy 
and those that are better endowed are higher in the 
hierarchy. The aim of this is to ensure that nodes 
that lack resources generally communicate 
security event information, or transmit potentially 
large evidence files towards more reliable and 
stable peers. It is assumed that nodes with more 
resources are more likely to be better equipped to 
deal with larger amounts of information and are 
also more likely to be online and available to be 
communicated with. 
A gradient overlay network is suited to ensure this 
form of a network structure. It is built in such a 
way that a utility metric is used to determine 
which nodes are most suitable to connect to, and 
which nodes to avoid. This utility metric is 
determined from a combination of factors 
including the amount of resources available on a 
node, the current state of use of the node and the 
amount of time that it has been online. These 
utility metrics are shared through random node 
interactions, typical of “gossip-based” (epidemic) 
P2P protocols in order for nodes to get to know of 
other nodes that might be better to link to. 
As gossip-based P2P protocols are known to 
eventually converge to a generally stable state, a 
hierarchy of the HbH systems is thus formed with 
the less endowed elements on the outer edges and 
the more capable elements closer towards the 
centre of the LEIA system (that is, the CBB). 
4.2.2. Dissemination and Aggregation of 
Malicious Behaviour Information & 
Alerts 
This capability is necessary in order to facilitate 
the collaborative mechanisms needed to ensure 
that security event information is shared, and that 
potentially useful evidence information is captured 
efficiently and transmitted securely. Security event 
information known by individual HbH peers is 
duly shared out to others in order for the overall 
system to have a more informed security posture 
as well as to be forewarned of imminent malicious 
events. This includes the distribution of malicious 
activity signatures as well as the discovery of 
malicious activity originating from certain hosts. 
When such messages are received, only a set of 
the most common and recently active malicious 
activity signatures are maintained at the HbH. 
These kind of messages are termed as 
“Management messages” and can be shared out to 
any peers that a particular HbH has address 
information about and that has connectivity. 
The other major type of messages that are 
involved in this functionality are termed as 
“Security Incident Control messages”. These 
messages facilitate the reaction to the detection of 
a malicious event. This mainly includes the 
communication of procedures to initiate the 
evidence capture process on certain components of 
certain nodes as well as initiating initial pre-
processing such as determining IP addresses of 
recently connected devices in order to extend the 
evidence capture process to other suspected 
devices. 
There may be other forms of messages that might 
need to traverse the P2P-da, however, the 2 
categories mentioned thus far are the major types. 
4.2.3. Incident response data collection 
This functionality is triggered by the detection of 
malicious events via the collective knowledge 
gained through collaborating HbH systems, the 
em-IDS and guest OS security mechanisms. For 
more volatile data such as network traffic and live 
memory, a fixed time period is chosen for which 
to perform the capture process (or a fixed number 
of snapshots of the data over a short period of time 
particularly for live memory) after which a 
decision is to be made whether subsequent 
captures need to be made, or whether what has 
been collected so far suffices. Correspondence 
with the Cloud-Based Backend-Differencing 
Engine (CBB-DE) filters out known system files 
through facilitating the hash comparisons. Primary 
analysis for IP addresses and hostnames on the 
data collected may result in triggering of other 
HbH systems to capture data also. 
The actual data collection procedure involves 3 
stages as described in the following sections. The 
diagram below (Fig. 2) depicts the data collection 
and transfer process of the P2P-da. 
 
 
Figure 2: The P2P-da Data Transfer process 
 
a) Data Partitioning 
Different data formats (memory dumps, logs, files, 
packet captures, disk images) are compressed and 
stored temporarily on the HbH system in a 
modified AFF4 data structure that also contains 
simple RDF metadata describing the evidence. 
This data structure is termed as the Incident Data 
Archive (IDA). Each IDA data structure is 
partitioned in equal size pieces that will be 
referred to as shards. The shard is a signed and 
encrypted partition of the IDA analogous to the 
idea of a “piece” in the BitTorrent Protocol. A 
metadata file termed as the “reflection” (which 
corresponds to the BitTorrent Metadata file) is 
also created and sent directly to the CBB. In this 
way the CBB acts as the “tracker” and “leeches” 
IDAs from participating HbH systems in the P2P-
da, thus benefiting from the high throughput of the 
BitTorrent protocol 
b) Shard Distribution 
Multiple copies of each individual shard are 
distributed to more capable neighbours 
(supporters), facilitated by the gradient overlay. 
Each time a shard is passed on it increases its 
“heat level”. After a certain “heat” threshold (that 
we refer to as the “melting point”) a HbH system 
is obliged to directly upload to the CBB (more 
specifically the HbH Master Peers of the CBB), 
else an election procedure is initiated to determine 
which previously supporting HbH should be 
delegated the uploading task. In order to avoid an 
individual node being the only “proxy” and thus a 
potential single point of failure, individual HbH 
systems are only allowed to partake in uploading a 
certain number of IDA shards governed by the 
“dependency value”. This improves the overall 
reliability of the larger system through reducing 
the possibility of having a single point of failure in 
the transmission process. 
c) Rapid fragment reconstruction 
For a particular shard, downloads are initiated 
from all their respective supporter locations. This 
is done for redundancy and bandwidth 
maximization purposes. Similar to the BitTorrent 
Protocol download, priority is given to the shards 
that are the least commonly available, that is, those 
that have the fewest recorded supporters. 
In order to reconstitute the IDA, individual hashes 
of shards are verified as they are received, against 
that in the reflection. Several supporters upload at 
the same time, thus if a shard is in error, that from 
another supporter is taken. Once successfully 
transferred, shards are deleted from supporting 
HbH systems. 
4.3. The Cloud-based Backend (CBB)  
The CBB system is a highly available, scalable, 
responsive, centralized back end storage service 
capable of storing large amounts of data in a 
homogeneous form. It is subdivided into 3 major 
components: The Storage System (SS), the 
Differencing Engine (DE) and the HbH Master 
Peers. 
The Storage System (SS) is built upon the Hadoop 
HDFS architecture (Shvachko, Kuang, Radia, & 
Chansler, 2010) that provides not only the raw 
storage capabilities but also scalability, 
availability, reliability and responsiveness. The 
Differencing Engine (DE) filters out known files 
before having them stored on the CBB. This is 
provisioned through the MapReduce (Dean & 
Ghemawat, 2008) capabilities supported by 
Hadoop. The DE also provides a query-response 
mechanism to the HBH systems with information 
on known benign data as part of the Master 
Known Data Hash-List (M-KDHL). The M-
KDHL contains data about known files, memory 
processes, protocol flows, and log entries and thus 
enables their removal from IDAs being prepared. 
This reduces the size of IDAs before being stored 
on the Storage System (SS) of the CBB.  
The HbH Master Peers are a particular set of well-
endowed peers that are directly connected to the 
core CBB system (that is, the SS and DE) 
providing an interface to the rest of the LEIA 
system through the P2P-da. They do not have 
other core functionalities unrelated to their LEIA 
responsibilities and are essentially the backbone of 
the P2P-da and ultimately the provider of 
connectivity of the LEIA system outwards to the 
other HBH systems. The HBH Master Peers also 
serve as the central point through which system 
software updates and malicious event detection 
heuristics are originated from and disseminated 
outwards to the HBH systems in the wild. 
 
 Figure 3: The Cloud-based Backend components 
 
4.4. The Law Enforcement Controller System 
The Law Enforcement Controller is the main 
interface that law enforcement personnel interact 
with in order to perform their directed analysis for 
a particular digital investigation case. Through it, a 
Law Enforcement Agent can initiate specific 
queries to the data sets stored on the CBB, thus 
retrieving detailed, structured information as well 
as new knowledge inferred through correlation of 
data originating from different sources that may 
help in solving a case. The aim of this is to 
automate otherwise manual tasks of correlating 
data from different heterogeneous sources in order 
to pose valid assertions based on the data that 
could assist a forensic analyst in performing their 
duties of making sense of digital artifacts. This 
functionality is described in more detail by Dosis 
in (Dosis, Homem, & Popov, 2013).  
Additionally, from the new found knowledge 
obtained through correlation, patterns of malicious 
activities are to be learnt and stored. These 
Malicious Activity Patterns are to be used as 
feedback to the HbH systems in order to improve 
the detection capabilities of the inbuilt IDS’s and 
thereby also improve the accuracy of collection of 
data of potential forensic evidentiary use. 
5. PROOF OF CONCEPT EVALUATION 
AND RESULTS 
As the first part of testing the motivations behind 
the designed architecture, we decided to focus on 
the network transmission component as it is 
critical in enhancing speedier evidence collection. 
In order to demonstrate the need for better 
throughput networks such as those exhibited in 
P2P overlays, an experiment was set up to 
simulate the conditions of the LEIA, however 
without the P2P-da component. This means that, 
the experiment was performed with the 
transmission of potentially evidentiary information 
from a HbH system to the CBB over a traditional 
client-server paradigm. The experiment itself 
focused on the time taken to perform remote 
extraction, compression and transmission of 
increasingly larger disk images over an encrypted 
channel from small scale devices over the Internet 
and the subsequent reconstruction and storage of 
this data on a Hadoop HDFS cluster.  
It should be mentioned that for the sake of 
simplicity of the experiment, the actual hypervisor 
of the HbH system was not built, however closely 
similar conditions – particularly in terms of the 
LEIA prototype application having privileged 
access – were met. 
In order to test and measure the performance of 
the proof of concept application working over the 
client-server paradigm, four different small scale 
devices were used. The table below outlines the 
specifications of the devices being captured. 
 
 
Table 1: Small scale device specifications 
Device Platform Processor Chipset RAM Disk 
Chumby Classic Busybox v1.6.1 
350MHz 
ARM926EJ-S 
Freescale i.MX233 64MB 64MB 
HTC Incredible S 
Android OS v2.3.3 
(Gingerbread) 
1 GHz Scorpion 
Qualcomm 
MSM8255 
Snapdragon 
768MB 1.1GB 
HTC MyTouch 4G Slide 
CyanogenMod 10.2 
Alpha 
Dual‐core 
1.2GHz Scorpion 
Qualcomm 
Snapdragon S3 
MSM8260 
768MB 4GB 
Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 
(WiFi Only) 
Android OS, v4.0.3 
(Ice Cream Sandwich) 
Dual‐core 1GHz TI OMAP 4430 1GB 8GB 
 
 
Figure 4: The experimental set up 
 
In order to perform the testing and the 
performance evaluation, partitions of the various 
devices were filled to specific size limits with 
random files, including images, PDFs, music files 
and compressed archive files (RARs) in order to 
simulate normal disk usage. These devices were 
subsequently captured over the network. The 
capture process was repeated 10 times for each 
individual partition size in order to get the average 
file transfer times that each size took. The sizes 
measured were taken at 9 intervals with gradually 
increasing sizes. The maximum size of 4GB was 
taken as the largest size because the average 
capture (file transfer) times were beginning to take 
rather long periods (50-80 minutes) per test 
acquisition round. Furthermore, the maximum disk 
size on any of the devices available for testing was 
8GB (with the rest being 4GB, 1.1GB and 64MB). 
A 4GB mini-SD card was also available and was 
used to supplement the HTC Incredible S in order 
to simulate a larger disk size. The Chumby Classic 
only had 64MB available of flash (NAND) 
memory, and no expansion capabilities, thus it was 
not included in the testing for remote data transfer 
performance as there was no way to increase the 
size of the storage capacity. It was, however, used 
in testing to show that the remote device capture 
of such a small scale device running on a Linux 
based platform was possible. It was also used as 
the main prototyping device because it had a rather 
small storage capacity that enabled rather quick 
disk acquisitions when testing the software 
developed. 
The repetition process and the use of the averaging 
was done in order to compensate for the effects of 
random processes that could have affected 
network transmission times. Such random 
processes could include network traffic from other 
users of the networks being used, phone calls 
coming in and interfering with the I/O processes of 
the devices, or applications being updated on the 
devices, among others. 
The tables below show the partition sizes used and 
the average times (in milliseconds) taken to 
perform the transfer: 
 
  
 Table 2: Results from Test Cases on "HTC Incredible S" 
Partition 
Amount used 
# of Test 
Runs 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
16MB 10 13664 
133MB 10 84600.8 
250MB 10 392323.9 
507MB 10 553933.1 
1000MB 10 978571.8 
1500MB 10 1360375 
2000MB 10 2932376.8 
3000MB 10 3877676.8 
4000MB 10 4814006.6 
 
Table 3: Results from Test Cases on "HTC MyTouch 4G Slide" 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Test 
Runs 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
21.4MB 10 8583 
87.0MB 10 31467 
255MB 10 230709 
500MB 10 338180 
1000MB 10 1174482 
1550MB 10 1323845.90 
2000MB 10 1673928 
3000MB 10 2052952.40 
4000MB 10 3015056.60 
 
Table 4: Results from Test Cases on "Samsung Galaxy Tab 2" 
Partition 
Amount Used 
# of Test 
Runs 
Avg. File Transfer 
time (ms) 
4MB 10 1235 
11MB 10 67608 
250MB 10 286947 
500MB 10 426783 
1000MB 10 960952 
1500MB 10 1488236 
2000MB 10 2829355 
3000MB 10 2951551 
4000MB 10 3707556 
 
The data above from three of the four different 
specimen devices is plotted on a graph in order to 
visualize the general trend of the file transfer time 
against the partition size for the client server 
network paradigm of remote evidence acquisition. 
The diagram that follows depicts the graph that 
was attained: 
 
Figure 5:  Performance of the LEIA Proof of Concept with the Client-Server paradigm 
 
From the figure above, the curves seem to start off 
with a linear relationship which soon seems to turn 
into more of an exponential relationship. The 
“HTC MyTouch 4G Slide” clearly portrays this 
characteristic, with the rest of the devices also 
exhibiting this however not as vividly. Overall 
there seems to be a more exponential relationship 
between the Partition Size and the File Transfer 
Time with respect to the larger sizes of partitions. 
One could posit that as the partition sizes increase, 
even to sizes substantially larger than those in the 
graph, the relationship will become ever more 
exponential. This means that the times taken to 
acquire such partition sizes would be increase in 
exponential magnitude and thus shows that the 
client-server paradigm is likely not suitable 
enough for the task of performing remote evidence 
acquisition, especially in the type of environment 
that the LEIA system is aimed at. This suggests 
the need for a more efficient network transfer 
paradigm for this type of activity. From this need, 
we postulate that the use of P2P networks, 
between the evidence capture location and the 
eventual storage location, could be a suitable 
replacement, as certain P2P overlays are known to 
provide better network throughput, and thus 
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shorter latency times between evidence capture 
and storage. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this study we outlined the numerous problems 
that blight the digital investigation process, and 
law enforcement agencies at large, rendering them 
slow and ultimately ineffective. We proposed a 
comprehensive architecture of a proactive, system 
– that makes used of hypervisors, P2P networks, 
the RDF framework and cloud storage – that could 
essentially revolutionize the digital investigation 
process through automation. Finally, through a 
small proof of concept, we demonstrate a limited 
part of this system, and motivate the need for a 
network paradigm with better throughput. Some 
P2P overlays demonstrate this and could possibly 
provide the solution to improving the speed of 
remote evidence capture. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
Though this architecture is promising, larger disk 
acquisitions need to be performed with more 
modern small scale devices that are equipped with 
larger storage capacities in order to further 
confirm the need for a more efficient form of 
network data transfer in the form of P2P 
communication. From the proposed architecture, 
several parameters within the P2P communication 
protocols need further optimization and testing. 
Additionally, a PKI infrastructure can be infused 
in the system in order to improve the security of 
the communication and storage facilities. Also, the 
storage capabilities of the Cloud-based Backend 
could be supplemented by that of participating 
HbH nodes in order to realize a more distributed 
and independent storage solution. The concept of 
privacy also needs to be addressed within the 
scope of this solution. Finally, an experiment with 
a wider scope, in terms of multiple devices being 
tested simultaneously, would be greatly desired in 
order to better drive this architecture towards 
becoming a reality.  
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